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The US Navy’s move to high-pressure and -temperature steam propulsion, 
otherwise known as “high steam,” has been viewed in the postwar period as a critical 
advance that made long-range operations possible during World War II. This 
position, which is almost entirely reliant on the autobiography of Rear Admiral 
Harold G. Bowen, has neglected to consider the complex and problematic nature of 
the supply chain required to produce high-steam turbines. Archival research has 
revealed that the US Navy’s insensitivity to these changes after 1938 caused severe 
bottlenecks in wartime destroyer production. Also overlooked was the aggressive 
administrative action on the part of the Navy’s Bureau of Ships and its turbine 
subcontractors required to mitigate this crisis. Together, these events formed an 
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Invention is one thing, manufacture is another. The US Navy’s transition to high-
pressure and -temperature steam propulsion in the 1930s is a striking reminder of the 
truth of this axiom. The employment of high-pressure and -temperature boilers and 
turbines, collectively known as high steam, provided US Navy warships with a 
significantly increased range. Historians have described this advantage as a critical 
innovation that made possible long-range operations in the Pacific Theater of World 
War II. However, no innovation has ever come without its own challenges. Postwar 
scholars, like the prewar US Navy before them, have overlooked the transformation 
of material requirements and production methods that accompanied high steam. The 
benefits of this technology actually came at a high cost. The Navy’s insensitivity to 
these changes between 1938 and 1942 nearly precipitated a collapse of wartime 
destroyer production, maintenance, and repair. It was aggressive action on the part of 
the Navy's Bureau of Ships that averted disaster. Specifically, the Bureau's efforts to 
assert control over turbine manufacturers and their suppliers after 1941 were critical 
in this endeavor. The complete story of high steam was not just a tale of mechanical 





Understanding Steam Power 
For the US Navy, high steam was simply the next logical step in the evolution of 
shipboard propulsion which began in the latter half of the 19
th
 century. The earliest 
marine steam engines consisted of a single or small number of boilers that burned 
wood or coal fuel in an open furnace, heating water into steam in a manner very 
similar to a steam locomotive. This steam was fed to a reciprocating engine, a device 
resembling a massive piston (or later a series of pistons). The engine in turn drove a 
paddle wheel or simple propeller through a direct connection such as a crankshaft. 
The advancing industrial revolution of the 19
th
 century brought with it 
improved materials and precision production techniques for the manufacture of 
complex engines. Cast iron was superseded by various steels, particularly carbon 
steel, which significantly improved the strength and durability of engine components. 
Mass-produced cast steel in particular allowed for steam boilers with fewer seams and 
higher temperature tolerances. This allowed for steam pressures to increase from 
around 50 pounds per square inch (psi) to around 200 psi by 1900.
1
 Temperature in 
these boilers was unregulated, meaning that on average the steam produced would 
remain at or very near the boiling point of water for the pressure in use. 
At the beginning of the 20
th
 century, the reciprocating engine was replaced in 
most major navies by the marine turbine, a modified engine originally created for 
land-based power stations. The turbine was a cylindrical engine that contained 
alternating rows of fixed “guide” blades and rotating “moving” blades, the latter of 
                                                 
1
 Hans Naegeli and A. C. Jones, “Carbon-Molybdenum Cast Steel for Steam Service” in Journal of the 




which were affixed to a central rotor. Steam was forced through the length of the 
turbine, spinning the rotor and expending temperature and pressure in the process. 
The temperature and pressure change within a turbine were collectively known as the 
“heat drop.” The greater the drop, the greater the efficiency.
2
 There were two types of 
turbines developed in the 1880s, differentiated by the location of the heat drop. The 
reaction turbine, pioneered by Charles Parsons, evenly divided the heat drop between 
the guide and moving blades for a constant rate of change. This required a long 
turbine and a very large number of blades to achieve maximum efficiency.
3
 The other 
was the impulse turbine, invented by Gustaf de Laval. In this engine, the entirety of 
the heat drop was contained in the alternating rows of stationary guide blades, 
allowing the moving blades to receive the greatest possible impulse from the 
expanding steam. Although the impulse turbine required significantly fewer blades 





 Despite the fact that turbines were much more complex than the 
reciprocating engine, both types were quieter, caused less vibration, and were more 
efficient. Dangers associated with steam engines were universal—steam in an 
enclosed system must be pressurized; boiler or pipe ruptures were capable of causing 
catastrophic damage. 
The adoption of the turbine to naval use posed a unique problem to engineers: 
how to efficiently connect the turbine rotor to a propeller. Turbines are generally 
                                                 
2
 Ingvar Jung, The Marine Turbine, Part 2 1928-1980: Development of Naval Turbines and the 
Engines of the Great Atlantic Liners (Greenwich, London: National Maritime Museum, 1986), 6-10. 
3
 The first turbine powered vessel was actually the Turbinia (1894), Parsons’ own vessel. He used it to 
turn up unannounced at the Royal Navy review of June 1897 in a dramatic demonstration of the speed 
and power the turbine promised. Given that the Royal Navy was unable to stop him with its own 
slower vessels and thus began ordering turbines for itself by 1899, it is safe to say Parsons was 
successful in this endeavor. 
4




highly efficient at velocities in the range of several thousand revolutions per minute 
(rpm). Conversely, propellers are only efficient at much lower speeds of a few 
hundred rpm. In order to allow a turbine rotor to efficiently turn a propeller, a 
reduction gear was interposed between the two.
5
 The reduction gear was a relatively 
simple innovation; a small gear attached to the turbine rotor turned a much larger gear 
wheel linked directly to the propeller shaft. However, despite the simple concept, this 
component was difficult to manufacture due to the precision required. The complexity 




 By the 1930s, navies the world over were considering or experimenting in a 
limited fashion with raising both the pressures and temperatures of steam in an 
attempt to produce vessels with more speed, horsepower, and range. Though high 
steam was clearly desirable for a greater heat drop, a number of technical barriers 
existed. To be properly utilized, high steam required reliable pressure and 
temperature control, a steel alloy capable of withstanding greater stresses than cast 
steel, an improved method allowing turbines and their linked propellers to rotate at 
vastly differing speeds to maintain peak efficiency, and extreme precision in the 
manufacture of turbine blades and casings. These obstacles were widely regarded as 
not only prohibitively expensive, but also dangerous. Without proper use of steel 
alloys, for example, rapid load changes due to the need for warships in combat to 
frequently change course and speed would very quickly cause high steam turbines to 
overheat and fail. In short, high steam required a level of industrial advancement that 
                                                 
5
 A propeller rotating at too high a speed causes excessive cavitation, which in turn causes excessive 
wear and inefficiency.  
6




was considered beyond the major naval powers of the 1920s. As a result, pressures 
and temperatures had remained relatively constant since the advent of the marine 
turbine. This trend continued for most navies until the postwar period. Other than a 




 The story of how the US Navy’s near monopolization of high-steam 
technology came about, and its impact on the outcome of the Second World War, is 
summarized in relatively brief sections of general works. These include Norman 
Friedman’s well-regarded US Navy Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History (2004), 
David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie’s Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in 
the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (1997), and Albert A. Nofi’s To Train the 
Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923-1940 (2010).
8
 There is general 
consensus that vast improvements in cruising radius attributable to high steam, 
particularly in the case of the US Navy’s destroyer force, made long-range operations 
in the Pacific Theater feasible by cutting down on fuel, refueling time, and the 
additional bases that otherwise would have been required to fight the Imperial 
                                                 
7
 The Japanese in particular experimented with 426 psi, 662°F, and eventually standardized these 
numbers for the Kagero class destroyers and Shokaku class carriers, according to David C. Evans and 
Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 246-48. 
8
 Friedman brings up the issue of high steam briefly using Bowen’s story in Chapter 5 (“Leaders and 
the Interwar Period, 1917-1940”) and in Chapter 7 (“The Destroyer Escorts, 1941-1945”), in which he 
makes a rare mention of the shortage of turbines and reduction gears during the Second World War, 
but goes no further. Evans and Peattie naturally focus primarily on the Japanese experimentation with 
high steam and only briefly visit upon the capabilities of the US Navy for point of comparison. For his 
part, Nofi relates the story of the range deficiency of US Navy destroyers rather than the change to 
high steam itself throughout his work. This is particularly apparent in the case of Fleet Problem XIV in 
1933, during which many of the Navy’s destroyers were afforded only a limited role due to their range. 
Norman Friedman, U.S. Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2004), 88, 95-97, 143-44, Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 246-48, and Albert A. Nofi, To Train the 





Japanese Navy. However, all renditions of high-steam development and employment 
closely follow the language of a single primary source: Rear Admiral Harold G. 
Bowen’s Ships Machinery, and Mossbacks: The Autobiography of a Naval Engineer 
(1954). Bowen, who was head of the Navy’s Bureau of Engineering from 1935-39 
when the controversy over the speedy adoption of high steam reached its critical 
stage, appears at first glance to be a knowledgeable and reliable source for this 
information. In this book, the reader is presented with statements such as, “high 
pressure high temperature [steam] formed the background of propulsion engineering 
during World War II. According to Vice Admiral Earle W. Mills, later Chief of the 
Bureau of Ships, our operations in the Pacific would not have been possible without 
it."
9
 All new technology brings with it benefits and drawbacks, yet Bowen presented 
only sunshine and rainbows. He neglected to discuss the immense challenges, namely 
the impact of this next-generation technology on the war effort itself. Why? The 
battle over implementation of high steam proved to be a pyrrhic victory that 
eventually cost Bowen, its chief advocate, his job as head of the bureau. It is only 
natural that he would seek to emphasize the resounding successes of the cause he 
championed. What has been lost as a result, however, is that the history of high steam 
is not just a tale of technological success, but also an instructive case study of 
administrative adaptability. 
                                                 
9
 Rear Admiral H.G. Bowen, Ships, Machinery, and Mossbacks: The Autobiography of a Naval 




Bowen’s Story: Evolution and Controversy 
The two-part story surrounding high steam involved warships of all classes, but 
focused primarily on destroyers, considered the smallest significant fleet unit. This 
class was ordered in greater numbers than all other types of vessels fitted with geared-
steam turbines, and thus required production en masse. Conversely, cruisers, 
battleships, and aircraft carriers, with their smaller numbers and long construction 
times had their equipment specially constructed. Since the time required to produce a 
destroyer was considerably shorter, demand for subcomponents such as engines was 
accelerated. The evolution of high steam would focus squarely on the destroyer. 
The early 1930s became a period of significant change for the US Navy, not 
only because of the adoption of high-pressure and -temperature steam, but also due to 
the preceding decade-long break in naval construction. Prior to the destroyers of the 




 Ship construction by the world’s major navies was limited severely 
throughout most of the interwar period by a series of treaties initiated by the 
Washington Naval Conference of 1922. The treaty system, put in place to stop an 
ongoing naval arms race primarily between the United States and Britain, limited 
almost every aspect of each signatory nation’s navy from the numbers of each ship 
class to a maximum tonnage and gun size. Not every nation was permitted to have the 
same total tonnage either; the total size of the world’s major navies was fixed at a 
                                                 
10
 The prior Clemson class had many minor variations, and is thus sometimes considered as a number 





ratio of 5:5:3:1.7:1.7 for the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, 
respectively. Accordingly, new naval construction was only permitted to replace 
“obsolete” vessels once a nation had reached its allotted tonnage. For this reason, 
very few ships were completed by any nation between 1923 and 1932. 
 A typical destroyer of the US’s pre-treaty Clemson class displaced 1,215 tons 
and had a maximum speed of about 35½ knots. The class was powered by four 
boilers that drove a pair of low-pressure turbines for a maximum of about 27,500 
shaft horsepower and a range of about 2,500 nautical miles at 20 knots or 4,900 
nautical miles at 15 knots. Built primarily by what Admiral Bowen referred to as the 
“Big Three” shipyards of Bethlehem Steel, Newport News Shipbuilding, and New 
York Shipbuilding, these ships were constructed entirely on site along with all their 
requisite machinery and spares. The turbines for these vessels were also produced by 
the shipyards utilizing a British design under license from Parsons, Ltd, along the 
same lines as those that Parsons produced for the Royal Navy.
11
 
 Technical specifications of the Clemson’s low-steam installation were typical 
of those found in pre-1932 US destroyers. Such a system utilized saturated steam oil-
burning boilers powering (mostly) reaction turbines linked by a single reduction gear 
to the propeller shafts.
12
 The turbines themselves were low-speed and -pressure 
machinery that possessed 17,500 blades and utilized steam at around 260-275 psi. 
The use of “saturated” steam meant that steam generated for power by the boilers was 
                                                 
11
 See Table 1 for comparative details. Friedman, U.S. Destroyers, 462.  
12
 The Clemson class had a mix of different turbines depending on which yard manufactured a given 
ship. The majority used Parsons reaction turbines, but some used subcontracted impulse turbines. Jung, 




very near the minimum temperature required for it to remain a dry gas at that 
pressure.
13
 This temperature typically remained around 450°F.  
 The period between design of the Clemson class (1918-19) and the resumption 
of destroyer production to replace ships considered “obsolete” by the treaty system in 
1932 witnessed significant advance in the field of land-based, power-generating 
turbines, which caught the attention of the Navy’s Bureau of Engineering. Chief 
among these improvements was the employment of higher pressures and temperatures 
resulting in more efficient use of steam, and by extension, fuel.
14
 Although the Navy 
(and Parsons, Ltd. in Britain) had not been willing to take the risks of developing 
high-steam technology in the 1920s, the American civilian firms of General Electric, 
Westinghouse, and Allis-Chalmers had accepted the challenge and succeeded. 
Beginning late in the 1920s, but only in earnest in the early 1930s, the Bureau of 
Engineering, charged with providing specifications for power plants of every new 
Navy warship, was keen to increase what had been perceived by numerous 
commanders in the US fleet as the woefully inadequate range of destroyers then in 
service.
15
 That range, about 4,900 miles at 15 knots for the Clemson class, is cited 
often as a major deficiency in records of the General Board of the Navy, particularly 
                                                 
13
 Bowen, Ships, Machinery, and Mossbacks, 53. 
14
 Ibid, 53. 
15
 Claims to this effect are everywhere in the General Board’s records. Several examples are Chairman 
of the General Board to the Secretary of the Navy, “1936 Building Program – Characteristics of 
Destroyers and Submarines,” 19 March 1935; General Board Study 420-9 “1935”; Records of the 
General Board of the Navy, Record Group 80.7.3; National Archives Building, Washington, DC, 
Gibbs & Cox, Inc. to Chairman of the General Board, “Memorandum supplementing the Testimony to 
be given by Mr. William Francois Gibbs in accord with Invitation to the firm of Gibbs & Cox, Inc. 
from the General Board for its opinion with respect to Pressures and Temperatures,” 1938; General 
Board Study 420-13 – December 1, 1938: Steam Conditions of Pressure; Records of the General Board 
of the Navy, Record Group 80.7.3; National Archives Building, Washington, DC, and Bureau of 
Engineering Memorandum to the General Board of the Navy, “General Engineering Matters,” 30 
November 1938; General Board Study 420-13 – December 1, 1938: Steam Conditions of Pressure; 





in reviews following fleet exercises.
16
 Beginning with the Farragut class of 
destroyers in 1932, the Bureau of Engineering gradually stepped up its pressure and 
temperature requirements for each successive design. The first major landmark stage 
in this process, however, was not the small step taken by the Farragut class, but the 
leap made by the Mahan class. 
 The 18 Mahan class destroyers, which were produced from 1934 to 1937, 
were a 1,500-ton design constructed largely by smaller shipyards either incapable or 
unwilling to build their own propulsion machinery. They were, as a consequence, 
fitted with two sets of General Electric-built impulse turbines producing about 49,000 
shaft horsepower and possessing 10 times fewer blades than the reaction turbines of 
the Farragut class. These turbines were arranged so that each propeller shaft was 
linked via a double-reduction gear to a high-pressure, low-pressure, and declutchable 
cruising turbine. Replacing the single gear-and-pinion, a double-reduction gear was a 
series of gear-and-pinion linkages permitting high turbine rotation speeds while 
occupying space smaller than a comparable single-reduction gear.
17
 The Mahan’s 
boilers, designed by Babcock & Wilcox, operated at 450°F and 650 psi and gave the 





                                                 
16
 Bowen also includes instances of this complaint, citing one exercise review as stating that the first 
action they took was to steam several hours west and then immediately refuel all destroyers. Though 
this issue does appear in the records of the General Board, it is only indirectly discussed by Nofi. 
Bureau of Engineering to the General Board of the Navy, 30 Nov 1938; General Board Study 420-13 – 
December 1, 1938: Steam Conditions of Pressure; Records of the General Board of the Navy, Record 
Group 80.7.3; National Archives Building, Washington, DC, and Nofi, To Train the Fleet for War, 
168. 
17
 Jung, The Marine Turbine, Part 2, 31-35. 
18





Figure 1: Locked-train, double-reduction gear designed for the Mahan class destroyers (1933), 
from Jung, The Marine Turbine, Part 2, 32. 
 
By the mid-1930s, it was clear to the Bureau of Engineering that the “Big 
Three” shipyards were not keeping pace with advancing steam technology.
19
 In 1935, 
the Bureau acted aggressively to initiate change. The “Big Three” shipyards were 
informed that the Navy had decided to enforce the Espionage Act in regards to their 
contracts with Parsons. The Navy claimed that these contracts required the “Big 
Three” to share crucial details of US warships with a foreign power.
20
 These 
shipyards were thus given the choice to either surrender their ability to bid on future 
Navy contracts or void their agreements with Parsons. As Bowen and the Bureau 
expected, this act forced a major change in the engineering status quo. The effect, 
                                                 
19
 Bowen repeatedly mentions this throughout his autobiography, but particularly focuses on this 
situation here. Bowen, Ships, Machinery, and Mossbacks, 56-59. 
20




however, was not to press the “Big Three” yards to build their own versions of high-
pressure and -temperature steam plants. Rather, it forced them into a cheaper 




 As might be expected, records indicate that the increase in destroyer range 
accompanying these changes was welcomed in the fleet.
22
 However, the pressures 
and temperatures in use in the Mahan class were not, according to Admiral Bowen 
and the Bureau of Engineering, the best that could be achieved. The next stage of 
development for high steam, which Bowen later claimed was simply a natural step 
forward, lay at about 850°F and 650 psi.
23
 These levels were first issued as part of the 
requirements for the Somers class in 1935. 
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Sources: Bowen, Ships, Machinery, and Mossbacks, 62-70, Friedman U.S. Destroyers, 462-5. 
 
*Somers achieved this range on her trials using only 600 psi, 700°F. 
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 Bowen, Ships, Machinery, and Mossbacks, 66-67. 
22
 Bureau of Engineering to the General Board of the Navy, 30 Nov 1938; General Board Study 420-13 
– December 1, 1938: Steam Conditions of Pressure; Records of the General Board of the Navy, Record 
Group 80.7.3; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
23




 High-steam plants went through a number of rapid iterations in the mid-1930s, 
but the stage embodied in the USS Somers (DD-381, 1937) was the first to include all 
the innovations required for effective employment of high steam: high-pressure and –
temperature impulse turbines, double reduction gears, a cruising turbine, and effective 
superheat control. Superheat, the excess heat present past the point at which steam 
remains “dry,” is desirable in larger quantities at higher turbine speeds. It can be 
dangerous to machinery at low speeds however, making accurate control absolutely 
critical to avoid damaging the turbines.
24
 Somers possessed superheating boilers 
which required pressurized “closed” type boiler rooms which, though functional, 
were highly uncomfortable for their crews. These superheated boilers, capable of 
producing steam at 600 psi and 850°F, were coupled to a three-turbine setup per 
propeller shaft: a high-pressure turbine, a low-pressure turbine, and a cruising turbine 
(these three are often referred to as a “set” per shaft, or even, confusingly, as a single 
unit at times). These turbines were linked to propeller shafts by double wheel-and-
pinion reduction gears to allow for maximum efficiency. A steam plant like this 
provided the Somers with a significant range advantage over every previous US 
destroyer class; during its trials Somers managed to steam 10,540 miles at 15 knots, 
or more than twice the endurance of a Clemson class unit.
25
 Only one additional 
prewar high-steam innovation would come after the completion of Somers: the air-
                                                 
24
 Ibid, 64-65. 
25
 See Table 1 for comparative details. Gibbs & Cox, Inc. to Chairman of the General Board, 
“Memorandum supplementing the Testimony to be given by Mr. William Francois Gibbs in accord 
with Invitation to the firm of Gibbs & Cox, Inc. from the General Board for its opinion with respect to 
Pressures and Temperatures,” 1938; General Board Study 420-13 – December 1, 1938: Steam 
Conditions of Pressure; Records of the General Board of the Navy, Record Group 80.7.3; National 




encased boiler, which provided Benson (DD-421, 1938) class destroyers and their 




Figure 2: One turbine and gear “set” for an Essex-class aircraft carrier. Though intended for a 
different ship class, this machinery differed little from that installed in US destroyers. The 
turbine casings have been lifted to expose the rotors for this photograph. From Jung, The Marine 
Turbine, Part 2, 35. 
 
Although this proved to be the highest stage of development realized until 
after the war, it was not where the Bureau of Engineering wished to stop. Admiral 
Bowen referred to the 600 psi and 850°F of the Somers and later as merely a stepping 
stone, like the Farragut and Mahan before it.
27
 However, although the Navy briefly 
toyed with the re-engined USS Dahlgren (DD-187) in 1939, no further serious 
progress was made in increasing pressures and temperatures until after 1945.
28
 
                                                 
26
 Jung, The Marine Turbine, Part 2, 17. 
27
 Bowen, Ships, Machinery, and Mossbacks, 92. 
28




 Unfortunately for the Bureau of Engineering, it was with the introduction of 
the Somers class that critics attempted to apply the brakes to this breakneck pace of 
engineering advancement. Resistance to the Bureau of Engineering’s ambitious 
specifications actually began to materialize with the resumption of destroyer 
construction in 1932 and escalated with the divided Gridley/Bagley class in 1935. It 
was with this split class, of which the four smaller yard-built Gridleys received higher 
pressure and temperature plants than the eight “Big Three” Bagleys, that the Bureau 
of Engineering decided to enforce the Espionage Act, setting off the Navy’s steam 
engineering controversy of the late 1930s. The outcry from the “Big Three” and 
Bureau of Construction and Repair over this matter meant that the Bureau of 
Engineering found serious opposition to its objectives. 
The high-steam controversy came to a head in the spring of 1938 with what 
Admiral Bowen refers to as the “Bath change,” a design decision resulting in the 
construction of a large number of destroyers from different contract years to a nearly 
identical high-steam design. So named for the implementation of the design changes 
beginning with USS Gleaves (DD-423) and USS Niblack (DD-424) built by Bath Iron 
Works, the entire process was opposed by Bethlehem Steel, who was also contracted 
to build 1938 class destroyers.
29
 Bethlehem, apparently convinced that it could 
produce destroyers using less advanced machinery that would prove to be just as 
efficient as those envisioned by the Bureau of Engineering, requested and was 
granted permission to build its share of the contract to different specifications to 
decrease production costs. Instead of a high-steam installation akin to the Somers’ 
three-turbine-per-shaft system, Bethlehem installed one low-speed, low-pressure 
                                                 
29




turbine in addition to one high-speed, high-pressure turbine per shaft, omitting a 
cruising turbine. In addition, the boilers utilized a less advanced “integral” type 
superheater (rather than one of the “controlled” type used by ships built to a design 
similar to the Somers).
30
 The first destroyer completed under this design, USS Benson 




The acceptance of these changes to Bethlehem’s contract encouraged the 
company to attempt the same design change in its bid for the later 1939 class 
destroyers. However, even though Bethlehem’s bid was lower than those of Bath and 
Federal, it was rejected on the basis of Admiral Bowen’s recommendation to the 
Secretary of the Navy.
32
 To some in the Bureau of Engineering and the Bureau of 
Construction and Repair this was a daring move, as it ran the risk that the “Big 
Three” might be unresponsive to further high-steam contract opportunities. Naturally, 
this concern was amplified by the fact that Bethlehem and its compatriots were the 
only private yards capable of constructing battleships.
33
 
 Following the “Bath change” and the subsequent specification of 600 psi, 
850°F for the contracts for new battleships #57-60, the high-steam debate was taken 
up by the General Board of the Navy, which began hearings on the matter on 25 
October 1938. The proceedings, featuring testimony from the commanders of Somers 
and her sibling USS Warrington (DD-383), presented arguments of those for and 
                                                 
30
 Ibid, 83. 
31
 Ibid, 83, and Friedman, U.S. Destroyers, 95-97. 
32
 Bowen, Ships, Machinery, and Mossbacks, 88. 
33






 As might be expected, proponents of the change to 600 psi, 
850°F emphasized the fuel efficiency of the new installations in the Somers class, 
equipping the ships in question with a cruising radius 21% greater than the USS 
Porter (DD-356), a 400 psi, 700°F destroyer ordered only a year earlier.
35
 
Additionally, proponents of high steam emphasized the reliability of the new power 
plants, along with the simplicity of the turbines.
36
  
For its part, the opposition accused the Bureau of Engineering of moving too 
rapidly in its power specifications without adequate testing. The new plants, it was 
claimed, were too expensive to manufacture and maintain, were bulky, and were 
potentially dangerous should failure occur with pressures and temperatures reaching 
twice that of older destroyers in the fleet.
37
 The Bureau of Engineering later countered 
in a formal memorandum following the live testimony. It associated the perceived 
“bulkiness” of the plants with design flaws of the Mahan class, which did indeed 
have cramped engineering spaces, but added that no successive designs had generated 
any complaints about space problems. As far as maintenance and danger, the Bureau 
asserted that new plants were in fact no more complex than a typical low-steam 
                                                 
34
 “Testimony of Lieutenant C.M. Dalton, Engineer Officer, USS Warrington, and Lieutenant C.J. 
Hardesty, Engineer Officer, USS Somers,” 20 October 1938; General Board Study 420-13 – December 
1, 1938: Steam Conditions of Pressure; Records of the General Board of the Navy, Record Group 
80.7.3; National Archives Building, Washington, DC 
35
 Bowen, Ships, Machinery, and Mossbacks, 70. 
36
 Ibid, 92-96. Bowen’s points are also emphasized in nearly identical phrasing in his testimony in the 
General Board’s records on the hearing as recorded in General Board Study 420-13 – December 1, 
1938: Steam Conditions of Pressure; Records of the General Board of the Navy, Record Group 80.7.3; 
National Archives Building, Washington, DC. Additional support for high steam is provided by 
“Statement from Commander J. E. Maher, Commanding Officer, USS Somers,” 20 November 1938; 
General Board Study 420-13 – December 1, 1938: Steam Conditions of Pressure; Records of the 
General Board of the Navy, Record Group 80.7.3; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
37
 “Testimony of Commander E.B. Thompson, Office of Naval Intelligence,” 21 October 1938; 
General Board Study 420-13 – December 1, 1938: Steam Conditions of Pressure; Records of the 




installation in the Royal Navy, and dangers resulting from high-steam leakage were 
already present and no less severe in low-steam plants.
38
  
Lacking conclusive evidence for either argument apart from the increase in 
range gained from high steam, the General Board issued nothing more than an 
“opinion based on opinions.” It agreed with the “Big Three” and its associated 
opposition to rapid advancements in high steam on the grounds that the Bureau of 
Engineering was moving far too quickly without adequate testing.
39
 However, it 
permitted the Bureau to continue with its higher pressure and temperature 
requirements for future designs.
40
 According to Admiral Bowen, this was a victory 
for progress and an important advance which made long-range destroyer operations in 
the Pacific possible, streamlined US naval strategy in the Pacific Theater and, due to 
the decreased number of refueling bases thus required, very likely shortened the 
war.
41
 Of course, these conclusions assumed a seamless transition to high steam. 
Unfortunately, this was not the case. 
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What Bowen Did Not Tell Us 
Putting aside its influence on warship range and military strategy, the US Navy’s 
adoption of high steam brought dramatic change to ship construction and, by 
extension, maintenance and repair. As has been stated, prior to the adoption of high-
pressure and -temperature steam, the primary yards contracted by the US Navy (apart 
from their own), the so-called “Big Three” of Bethlehem Steel, Newport News 
Shipbuilding, and New York Shipbuilding, built power plants and spares for their 
own ships on site under license from Parsons, Ltd.
42
  Severance of these licenses as a 
result of the enforcement of the Espionage Act in 1935 leveled the playing field. It 
forced the major yards to compete with smaller ones that purchased independently 
built, high-pressure boilers and turbines from contractors such as General Electric, 
Westinghouse, and Allis-Chalmers. Lacking expertise, the “Big Three” resorted to the 
practice of their competitors—they, too, began contracting off-site for their turbines 
and associated engine components. This expedient was encouraged by the Bureau of 
Engineering during its high-steam initiative as a means to achieve higher pressures 
and temperatures. The Bureau even went so far as to offer to provide the “Big Three,” 
at its own expense, the high steam machinery for the new battleships contracted in 
1938.
43
 This shift in methodology is cited as a major milestone by Admiral Bowen 
himself—he points to this change as the transition of the shipyard from construction 
                                                 
42
 Bowen, Ships, Machinery, and Mossbacks, 56-57. 
43




site, where everything was built from scratch, to assembly yard, where pre-built 
components were brought together.
44
 
 Reliance on outside contractors for turbines, however, had its own set of 
challenges which went largely unmentioned by Admiral Bowen: it fostered stagnation 
of private shipyard power-plant investment and development. Naturally, with outside 
acquisition of pre-built turbines and spares as the new standard in ship construction, 
there was no longer a need for the “Big Three” (or any private yard for that matter) to 
continue maintaining up-to-date machining equipment and personnel for the rapid 
manufacture of precision components necessary to build and use turbines. The 




 On the other side of this new production paradigm were turbine suppliers, 
particularly General Electric and Westinghouse. By 1937-38, these manufacturers 
might have been expected to increase production capacity substantially for high-
pressure and -temperature naval turbines in response to the enforcement of the 
Espionage Act. There is, however, no evidence of their having done so.  
Why not? The answer might be related to the 1938 General Board hearing—
that largely noncommittal ruling regarding the use of higher-pressure and -
temperature steam. The Board’s indecision over the matter hardly guaranteed future 
naval contracts to these companies; at the time it was just as likely that the major 
shipyards might again begin building their own turbines, particularly if the Navy 
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changed course and adopted the more conservative approach to engineering advances 
advised by the General Board.
46
 Additionally, with the treaty system still in effect 
until 1938, it was highly unlikely that any major contract orders would materialize in 
the near future. Existing capacity was adequate to manufacture turbines for the small 
numbers of destroyers then being built to replace those considered “obsolete” under 
the treaties—typically warships over 20 years old. The net result was a shipbuilding 
industry increasingly reliant on independent turbine contractors with limited 
experience and capacity for military construction.   
Compounding this situation was a general lack of appreciation for supply 
mobilization planning on the part of the US Navy prior to World War II. Unlike the 
US Army, the Navy had no single agency that monitored the service’s current and 
future needs, nor did it have any sort of contracting oversight. The Navy’s supply 
system was highly decentralized and had been ever since its success during the First 
World War. Six separate bureaus were charged with procurement during the interwar 
period: Engineering, Construction & Repair, Supplies & Accounts, Aeronautics, 
Ordinance, and Yards & Docks. These organizations were nominally supervised by 
the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, but neither was actually 
equipped or willing to do so before 1941.
47
 Like any bureaucracy left to its own 
devices, the individual Navy supply bureaus had thus become set in their ways and 
highly territorial by 1939, and conflicts of interest between them were quite common. 
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They had no significant coordination and no will or ability to accurately predict their 
future needs.
48
 In this sort of environment, it is therefore no small coincidence that 
naval contractors would be unwilling to take a risk on expansion. 
 The end of the treaty system, the rising threat posed by Japan in the Pacific, 
and the rearmament of Germany combined to change this situation entirely after 
1937-38. Beginning with the Benson and Gleaves destroyer classes in 1938, 
destroyers were ordered in ever-increasing quantities in an attempt to provide 
adequate numbers of escorts to a fleet facing the prospect of war on two oceans. 
While the US Navy had ordered 106 destroyers between 1932 and 1940, 412 
contracts would be issued between January 1941 and December 1945—four times as 
many destroyers in half the time.
49
 
 The system for ordering new vessels was not substantially changed between 
the General Board hearings on high steam and the end of the Second World War, but 
the bureau system itself was altered in order to streamline the vessel design phase. In 
1939-40, in an attempt to reduce department redundancy and conflicts of interest such 
as that which resulted in the high-steam controversy, the Bureau of Engineering and 
the Bureau of Construction and Repair were unified to create the Bureau of Ships, 
now responsible for all stages of the vessel design, procurement, and maintenance 
processes.
50
 In the interest of maintaining continuity, Rear Admiral Samuel M. 
Robinson, Bowen’s successor (and predecessor) as chief of the Bureau of 
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Engineering, was appointed chief of the Bureau of Ships. The new organization was 
charged with managing an already unwieldy network of contractors now crucial to the 
“shipyard as assembly yard” process. This would prove to be an enormous task. 
As World War II approached, two major complications had emerged that 
threatened to choke the Navy’s expansion program. The first of these was inadequate 
Bureau control over subcontractors now relied upon for turbine production; the 
second was the availability of special-purpose machine tools necessary for the mass 
production of high pressure turbines. 
 At the onset of naval expansion in 1938, contracts for warships were awarded 
to the lowest bidding entity that in turn was expected to hire its own subcontractors 
for raw steel, power plant components, and other materials required to fulfill their 
contracts. Under this process, the Bureau of Ships directly controlled the allocation of 
work to upper-level contractors, but had no direct influence over the successive lower 
tiers of material production. Yards were thus free to set delivery dates and priorities 
for each of their subcontractors based on their own schedules. Naturally, such a 
situation resulted in order pileups with turbine manufacturers as demand accelerated, 
setting off panic at the first major signs of production trouble in reports appearing at 
the Bureau of Ships in the middle of 1941.
51
  
 In its postwar review, the Bureau of Ships highlighted its failure to exercise 
direct control over both material procurement and component subcontracting as a 
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major cause of delays in turbine manufacturing that began to crop up in 1940.
52
 The 
Navy’s interwar disregard for supply oversight meant that fundamental changes in 
how ships were built had gone completely overlooked. The transition to high steam 
was not merely a change in temperatures and boiler pressures, but a radical shift 
encompassing numerous innovations. As Admiral Bowen himself stated, the term 
“high steam” refers to all those technological advances that were combined into what 
became the Navy’s principal means of propulsion during World War II.
53
 Although 
many within the Bureau of Ships understood this as it related to machinery (boilers, 
superheat control, high pressure turbines, and reduction gears), they failed to grasp 
fully the extent of this transformation as it affected material requirements. High-
pressure and -temperature steam propulsion was only made possible by the 
commercial development of high tensile alloys, particularly carbon molybdenum 
steel, which was able to withstand the enormous stresses caused by prolonged 
exposure to high steam.
54
 These materials were not available in adequate amounts 
during the Second World War due to a limited production capacity combined with 
competing orders from the Navy, the rest of the US military, and the civilian 
economy.
55
 Although this shortage was eventually recognized and eased through the 
creation of the Navy’s Office of Procurement and Material in 1942, the initial damage 
was severe. Surprisingly, this lack of oversight was also problematic in the areas of 
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more common steel and bronze casting. Unforeseen and conflicting demands, 
exacerbated by a lack of even expansion of production capacity caused widespread 
shortages both real and perceived. Such an issue demonstrates both a lack of 
familiarity with long chains of industrial production on the part of the Bureau of 
Ships and the shortcomings of the Navy’s decentralized supply structure. While these 
issues are cited by the Bureau of Ships’ postwar review as major failures, they were 
compounded by another major factor that prevented the rapid expansion of these 
industries to match demand—machine tool shortages.
56
 
 Machine tools are vital components of any major production line. These are 
divided into two primary types: general-purpose and special-purpose. While general-
purpose machine tools can perform many roles in different industries, special-purpose 
tools are designed with a very specific task in mind and cannot easily be put to other 
uses. In the United States both before and during the Second World War, special-
purpose machine tools were produced via a lengthy cooperative process between the 
tool producers and product manufacturers. As one might expect, this practice was not 
well-suited to rapid expansion.
57
 
 Unfortunately for the US Navy, the use of special high-tensile steel alloys and 
the need for precision manufacturing meant that high-steam turbines and reduction 
gears required special-purpose machine tools for their manufacture. The length of 
time required for new tools to be produced meant that, despite early orders, it was not 
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until late in the war that the turbine industry could even hope to be able to meet 
demand.
58
 At the same time, areas of warship production that could get by with 
general-purpose tools were able to expand with relative ease to accommodate Navy 
contracts. This included the shipyards themselves, which were no longer required to 
manufacture their own turbines.
59
 Such a capacity mismatch between the yards and 
their turbine suppliers, by this time principally General Electric, Westinghouse, and 
Allis-Chalmers, exacerbated the shortage of raw materials necessary for turbines and 
high-steam valves.  
 The perfect storm was brewing for the Navy with its dependence on private 
shipyards utilizing independent subcontractors, lack of Bureau oversight of warship 
component production, limited capacity of turbine manufacturers, and shortage of 
machine tools. Unless significant action was taken, the Navy’s plans were poised for 
collapse with the onset of war. The Navy’s supply system, already stressed from the 
simultaneous production of several dozen destroyers in 1941, was subsequently 
expected to massively increase its output.  
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Table 2: US Navy Destroyer Production from 1932-45. 
Year Laid Down Launched Commissioned 
1932 3 0 0 
1933 8 0 0 
1934 21 6 2 
1935 13 13 6 
1936 9 17 22 
1937 12 9 15 
1938 14 16 5 
1939 15 15 17 
1940 11 18 18 
1941 87 24 23 
1942 101 119 81 
1943 89 101 130 
1944 87 85 86 
1945 48 72 72 





Storm on the Horizon 
Although the wartime problems associated with high steam were already manifest 
well before the outbreak of war, the recognition of their existence by the Navy only 
came gradually as conflict approached and orders for spares and new ships rapidly 
escalated. The conventional story of high steam terminates just before this point with 
the Bureau of Engineering’s victory in the General Board hearing. But this was only 
the first act in the story of making high steam a viable system for general use. 
The first tangible signs of turbine trouble for the US Navy surfaced as early as 
1940 with a major recall of defective turbine blades in 22 destroyers.
60
 Although 
significant in that it raised concerns that a major high-pressure turbine contractor—
Westinghouse—was unfamiliar with the stress requirements of marine turbines, as 
opposed to land-based ones, even more disturbing was the process required to 
overhaul and replace defective blades. This replacement order suffered numerous 
delays caused by Westinghouse’s already overloaded schedule, as one delivery of 17 
sets of turbine blading was 30 days late. With large-scale destroyer procurement well 
underway by 1940, the ability of one of the Navy’s major turbine subcontractors to 
produce new engines and spares on time was already questionable. Fortunately for the 
Navy, the delays at this stage were not considered to be critical. No radical action was 
required to deal with the delay outside of running these destroyers a few extra weeks 
with their defective turbines on reduced power.
61
 Though this practice severely 
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limited the performance of the ships in question, it prevented the defective blades 
from damaging the rest of the engine. This was a viable option since America was not 
officially at war; so the ability to steam at full speed was not essential. For the time 
being, turbine delivery priority could continue to be given to those contracts that had 
been under order longest (usually those for equipment for new ships) over contracts 
for spares. However, it was not to be long before the lack of turbine production 
capacity was felt on a larger scale. 
By the first half of 1941, the turbine shortage was spreading to ships under 
construction. Prior to naval expansion in the early 1940s, destroyers built by larger 
shipyards, such as the “Big Three,” typically took two to three months to commission 
after launch, while smaller shipyards with less experience generally took three to five 
months.
62
 It was during this interim period that engines, electronics, and armaments 
were installed. Beginning around May 1941, records of the Bureau of Ships indicated 
that turbine components for 24 destroyers being constructed by Bethlehem Steel were 
encountering significant delays that would substantially extend the launch to 
commission time of these vessels. While schedules for deliveries for four of these 
ships had been made, the production delays were such that the company was unable 
to promise individual turbine delivery for the rest of the hulls in question by a 
specifiable date. Instead, engines would be assigned, “according to when they are 
needed most,” with hopes of preventing any significant delays.
63
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Large private shipyards such as Bethlehem were not alone in their problems 
with turbine contractors in mid-1941. By June, the Bureau of Ships’ records noted a 
further 43 destroyers expected or already delayed due to the failure of their turbine 
manufacturers, General Electric and Allis-Chalmers, to meet their respective yard 
delivery dates. The estimated delays in question for these yards—Consolidated of 
Orange, Texas, Gulf S.B. Company, and various US Navy yards—ranged from one to 
16 months. The Bureau of Ships recognized there was the tendency of some yards, in 
this case Consolidated, to request components “much earlier than [actually] 
required.”
64
 While the Bureau did not believe pushing back or simply ignoring the 
requested turbine delivery dates would result in the on-time delivery of 
Consolidated’s 12 destroyers, it would theoretically reduce the delay to two to six 
months rather than the claimed 12 to 16. The Bureau acknowledged, however, that 
there was a bottleneck in turbine production that had resulted from both the lack of 
overall capacity and low availability of machine tools for the creation of turbine 
blading.
65
 It added that delays caused by this problem tended to be underestimated 
and were likely to be more severe than predicted. This information precipitated the 
earliest attempts by the Bureau of Ships to mitigate the turbine production problem. 
The Bureau reassigned to Charleston Navy Yard and Norfolk responsibility for 
completing turbines assigned to two of the destroyers in question. Although this 
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action would result in these particular units being about six months late, the Bureau 
expressed hope that this would reduce the delay in subsequent vessels. Fortunately for 
the Navy, it eventually would.
66
 
Clearly, the Bureau of Ships was beginning to realize the severity of its 
emerging turbine- and gear-production problems. In November of 1941, Bureau chief 
Robinson issued a directive to all supervisors of shipbuilding and navy yard 
commandants to cease the manufacture of shore spares for all new warships and 
devote all possible efforts to completing primary turbines and reduction gears as 
swiftly as possible.
67
 Shore spares, essentially duplicate steam plants typically 
delivered in tandem with components to be mounted on newly constructed warships, 
were critical in both war and peace for keeping engines well maintained and 
minimizing repair time. Thus, suspending production of shore spares was an 
extremely risky expedient considering the outbreak of war soon seemed likely if not 
certain. This was a clear sign of trouble for the US Navy in late 1941. Unfortunately, 
even this measure would not be enough to reduce mounting production delays. 
 Such was the climate for the Destroyer Escort Program in late 1941, a 
program characterized by the Bureau of Ships itself as simultaneously one of the 
greatest successes and greatest failures of the war.
68
 Although destroyer escorts in 
general were roughly half the displacement of a fleet destroyer and much less well 
armed, they required the same kind of propulsion machinery as their larger 
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counterparts. As a result, this program was adversely affected not only by the turbine 
shortage, but also by the accompanying less-severe shortage of reduction gears 
required for high-steam plants to function efficiently. Naturally, this gear shortage 
was also a potential threat to the timely completion of full-size destroyers and was 
often mentioned in tandem with turbine delays in correspondence of the Bureau of 
Ships. However, delays with gears were typically not as severe as those associated 
with the turbines themselves and were usually much more easily accommodated or 
eliminated. Unfortunately for the Navy, shortages in both turbines and gears were 
acute enough that a sudden order of several hundred destroyer-type engineering 
plants was more than sufficient to overwhelm the capacity of the turbine 
manufacturers.
69
 As a result, many ships of the Destroyer Escort Program were 
ultimately completed using propulsion methods substantially different from and 
significantly less efficient than traditional steam-power plants.
70
 Although 
compromised from a design perspective, this decision allowed all ships of the initial 
order batch to be delivered to the Navy by the end of 1943.
71
 Additionally, the 
compromise in design forced the Bureau to increase its investment in diesel 
propulsion and production, thereby significantly advancing that field but at a cost of 
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fielding a fleet of escort ships with “inferior speed.”
72
 By the war’s end, about 229 
destroyer escorts had been completed with various diesel drives, while another 124 
were completed with steam turbo-electric drives that did not require reduction gears. 
Only 87 were equipped with traditional geared-steam turbines, all of which were 
available only after March of 1944.
73
  
A moratorium on the manufacture of shore spares and the alteration of the 
design of destroyer escorts was not enough to eliminate the turbine shortages faced by 
the US Navy. To make matters worse, the Bureau of Ships’ policy of giving 
production priority to new shipping over maintenance was not a viable wartime 
solution. Such an act would virtually ensure the rapid degradation of the fleet’s 
combat power due to battle damage and heavy wear. Thus, desperate measures were 
required to reverse the escalating turbine shortage and to ensure the fleet both 
maintained its current strength and continued to expand. Problems from this 
combination of circumstances would become so acute that by April 1942 a 30% 
reduction in the entire naval construction program was considered a definite 
possibility unless solutions could be found.
74
 
                                                 
72
The diesel classes were typically only able to produce enough power to run up to 19 or 21 knots, 
while the steam classes could make 24. Ibid, 182-84. 
73
 Interestingly, Admiral Robinson was a major proponent of the DE program throughout this period 
despite the production problems all destroyers encountered. 
74




War, Shortages, and Damage Control 
The outbreak of war brought home the need for a shift in turbine policy. The attack 
on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 presented the Navy with its first large-scale 
emergency need for spares and posed the certain prospect of further spikes in demand 
in the near future. Maintenance of the Navy’s existing warships took priority over 
new construction. Additionally, with the Navy’s primary turbine suppliers falling 
increasingly behind in their contracts by 1942, the Navy finally moved in earnest to 
counteract the turbine production shortfall. In January of 1942, Robinson was 
promoted to vice admiral and placed in charge of the newly created Office of 
Procurement and Material (OP&M). Conceived by Secretary of the Navy Frank 
Knox, this office was charged with supervising and coordinating procurement efforts 
for every bureau in the Navy. OP&M served to both centralize control over the “shore 
establishment” of the bureaus as well as provide a means by which accurate supply 
statistics and projections might finally be calculated and utilized. It was under 
Robinson’s watch that OP&M handled the rationing of critical raw materials and 
conflicting demands with other branches of the military.
75
 Although bureaucratic 
infighting would continue to cause production ripples, the period of direct 
competition between the bureaus for raw materials was finally over.
76
 Succeeding 
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Robinson as chief of the Bureau of Ships were Rear Admiral Alexander Van Keuren 
(January 1942-November 1942) and Rear Admiral Edward L. Cochrane (November 
1942-46). This centralized control by a mostly civilian, business-savvy OP&M 
pressed the Bureau of Ships to take a much more directed approach to counteracting 
the turbine shortages plaguing new destroyers. What followed was the 
implementation of three primary policies, some of which had already been put to 
limited use. All three included direct intervention by the Bureau of Ships in the affairs 
of both their contractors and subcontractors.
77
  
Given the wartime stresses on the economy, it should come as little surprise 
that the Bureau of Ships’ ability to counter the turbine shortages was limited to the 
resources it already had available to it. Therefore, the first method utilized to 
minimize turbine production delays was to shuffle partially completed turbines and 
turbine components between manufacturers as they completed contracts, freed up 
production space, or found themselves suddenly unable to cope with orders. This 
policy resulted in a few front-end delays due to the shuttling of partially completed 
turbines around the country and the extensive paperwork involved, and there were 
other impediments as well. Instances of confusion regarding exchanges are apparent 
in the records of the Bureau of Ships and are particularly evident in the early days of 
this practice (late in Robinson’s tenure at the Bureau from 1941-42).
78
 Even worse, in 
several instances entire contracts were mistakenly dropped due to simple 
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miscommunication between the various companies involved in an exchange. 
Fortunately, in most severe cases, the problem was quickly discovered by the 
Bureau.
79




 The second method employed by the Bureau of Ships was, ironically, to 
facilitate the contracting of both Navy and private shipyards to build engines or 
engine components for turbine manufacturers. Initiated on a large scale in partnership 
with Allis-Chalmers in 1941, this method had a major shortcoming—virtually none of 
the private yards possessed the tools or expertise to produce even low-pressure 
turbines after 1938.
81
 As a result, the turbine manufacturer or the Navy had to provide 
the shipyards with the necessary personnel and, often, tools as well as funding for this 
endeavor.
82
 As might be expected, the use of Navy yards for this type of 
subcontracting was far more commonplace than private yards. Not only were the 
Navy yards easier for the Bureau of Ships to supervise, but the Navy typically had 
better access to the resources required for turbine blading, casings, and final 
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assemblies. As a result, the various Navy yards became a major source of turbine 
components (and even in numerous cases entire turbines) for the turbine 
manufacturers.
83




 The third approach to combat the severe turbine production delays was to 
cultivate additional production sources from companies not yet involved in turbine 
production but in possession of adaptable capacity. This involved contacting various 
owners of machinery similar to that used by the turbine suppliers, as they had the 
potential to be repurposed for producing turbines. With Westinghouse falling 
increasingly behind in its orders in early 1942, the Bureau contacted DeLaval, a 
company that already produced reduction gears for the Navy, the Elliott Company, 
and Murray Iron Works.
 85
 Unfortunately, the response to this initiative was poor, as 
most companies lacked the capacity to take on any new types of work without 
significant retooling well into 1943—an insurmountable obstacle in light of the 
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nationwide shortage of precision machinery.
86
 This approach by the Bureau was so 
underproductive that the Navy was forced to rely largely on its other patchwork 
methods of subcontracting its own yards and component swapping between turbine 
suppliers to minimize effects of delays. 
 As efforts to stabilize turbine production progressed, the Navy was busy 
fighting a war that constantly required the Bureau of Ships to provide maintenance on 
vessels which had either taken enough damage to require turbine or component 
replacements or had simply worn out their engines. War had a curious effect on 
equipment of all types; despite all preparations and expectations, very rarely did 
anything work quite as intended. Ships were no exception to this rule—they were 
loaded down more heavily, steamed faster, maneuvered more aggressively and, of 
course, took damage from bombs, torpedoes, and gunfire. All of these factors had the 
effect of decreasing the range and expected lifespan of a warship’s engines, and thus 
particular care and attention had to be given to keep a warship combat ready. 
Maintenance was indispensible to the wartime US Navy and accordingly overrode 
new construction in priority throughout the Second World War, despite the fact that 
new vessels continued to be commissioned without their matching shore spares after 
November 1941. To combat this shortage, three methods of acquiring spares on 
demand were put to use by the Navy—seizing engines completed for new vessels, 
issuing emergency priority contracts, and finally issuing pre-emptive contracts that 
could be escalated should circumstances demand it. 
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At the onset of the war, spares could be obtained from engines already 
completed for new or existing warships. Though obviously quick and effective 
options as far as repairs were concerned, there were two problems with this course of 
action. First, if the Navy chose to seize an engine from a ship nearing completion, 
then that vessel was set back considerably in the contract queue. It would be useless 
to the Navy until a new contract could be issued and filled, setting back ships already 
delayed by the wait for their turbines by an even larger margin. The second issue was 
that despite the relative standardization of engine specifications prior to the Second 
World War, turbines were not always interchangeable between different ship types 
and classes. As a result, the options for this repair method were at times quite limited.
 
Fortunately for the Navy, the fleet opened the war in the Pacific with a large number 




As the war in the Pacific progressed, major battles and changing priorities 
caused contracts for spare turbine components to be regularly displaced from the 
order queues of the turbine manufacturers. This is evidenced by the manner in which 
Midway and the battles of the first half of 1942 pushed carrier turbines ahead of 
destroyers in Westinghouse’s production orders.
88
 By and large, however, by the 
middle stages of the war, the Navy was issuing contracts for spares primarily on an 
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emergency basis only, immediately displacing all other orders for priority-repair 
orders. This policy was no less disruptive than seizing engines from nearly completed 
vessels. It, too, was quickly dropped in favor of the third method of ensuring the 
readiness of spare parts, which rose to prominence as the war progressed. 
This final method for providing spare turbines and components for the US 
Navy’s vessels, particularly its destroyers, was to issue contracts for components 
whenever possible far in advance of the expectation that they would be needed. The 
catch was these contracts were issued with the understanding that they could be 
escalated in size or priority should circumstances demand it. Unlike the issuance of 
emergency contracts on the spot which displaced other orders significantly and 
worsened the overall turbine situation, this method ensured that the effects of sudden 
contract changes were minimal. By latter half of the war, raw materials were 
significantly less of a problem for turbine manufacturers than manpower and capacity 
thanks to efforts of the Navy. Issue of a contract in this manner therefore ensured that 
the contractor immediately began allocating the materials necessary to fulfill the 
contract conditions. Everything would be on hand were it to be abruptly needed, 
thereby minimizing the time required to retool and make other changes necessary to 




  Despite these improvements however, evidence suggests that turbine 
production capacity was still not at an acceptable level for the Bureau of Ships in 
1944. The Navy’s displeasure is demonstrated within contract negotiations between it 
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and primary turbine suppliers for the production of replacement turbines and 
reduction gears for destroyers damaged in combat. These negotiations, conducted by 
the Bureau’s Contract Negotiation Board, produced official transcripts covering 
precise content, nature, and proposed delivery dates of each job, as well as the Navy’s 
understanding and position for each. Common are statements such as, “We would like 
to have that equipment much earlier than March-April 1945, but we understand that it 
cannot be completed earlier without disturbing existing schedules.”
90
 The Bureau of 
Ships appears to have accepted that private turbine production would continue to be a 
bottleneck in warship construction despite the vast production increases elsewhere 
and its relatively successful attempts to counteract delays.  
The Navy never hit upon a perfect solution to the turbine production shortfall, 
but the Bureau of Ships’ patchwork approach of subcontracting and disbursing 
available components to locations where they were most needed began to draw 
turbine delivery dates ever closer to their yard requirements as 1943 drew to a close 
(see Appendix). Production orders after the middle of 1943 avoided significant delays 
as increasing machine tool availability finally brought up precision production 
capacity, while patchwork measures enacted by the Bureau to meet deadlines became 
standard practice. Although production concerns persisted throughout the war, wide-
scale disaster due to the new technology and its associated production methods had 
been averted. 
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Although it may not seem apparent to a casual observer, a shortage of destroyers was 
a critical problem for the US Navy. While smaller than carriers, cruisers, and 
battleships, destroyers were generally the most numerous class of warship in any mid-
20
th
 century navy. They were required as escorts or as the primary force for virtually 
every naval mission imaginable. The US Navy was no exception; almost nothing 
moved in the Navy without the support of destroyers.
91
 Fewer destroyers meant fewer 
or delayed operations, heavier wear on those already in service from extensive use, 
and increased impact of ships lost in combat. In short, the US Navy needed as many 
destroyers as it could get as fast as the yards could build them. 
Fortunately for the Navy, the proposed large-scale cuts in naval construction 
due to problematic shortages of machine tools, steel, and turbines proved to be 
unnecessary. Although turbine production for destroyers in particular was a serious 
problem right up to 1944, the Navy managed to acquire enough equipment to fight 
effectively and win the war against Japan. What was compromised, however, was the 
proper and timely maintenance and repair of ships prior to the war, as well as on-time 
delivery of new ships once hostilities had begun. Generally, the shortage of spare 
turbines and turbine components and significant delays imposed on fleet destroyer 
production as a whole conspired to place a hard limit on destroyer availability 
through 1944 and left the Bureau of Ships scrambling. 
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 It would be incorrect to assert that no one anticipated problems associated 
with the adoption of high-pressure and -temperature steam at the height of its 
controversy in 1938. Admiral Bowen himself stated in his autobiography the potential 
for production difficulties in precision industries in a time of war. But clearly the 
complexity of the turbine bottleneck came as a nasty surprise to the Navy.
92
 No one at 
the Bureau of Ships, as late as 1940, appears to have appreciated the obstacles 
presented by the production of a high-steam plant as opposed to its low-steam 
counterpart, particularly during a time of high demand. The Navy paid a stiff price for 
this oversight. 
 “According to Vice Admiral Earle W. Mills, later Chief of the Bureau of 




 After careful examination, Admiral Bowen’s assessment of high steam should 
be viewed in a different light. While high steam certainly gave the US Navy superior 
range against its Japanese counterpart, it simultaneously proved to be a serious 
impediment to the buildup of the Navy’s assets. Without the Office of Procurement 
and Materials’ administrative successes in handling steel, valve, and machine-tool 
shortages and the Bureau of Ships’ creative management of turbine contracts, this 
advanced technology may have crippled the construction and maintenance of 
destroyers. It was effective administrative improvisation on the part of the Navy that 
allowed the United States to take advantage of this technology at all. The complete 
story of high steam is something far more unique than a tale of innovation. High 
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steam was an example of traditional “American ingenuity,” just not in the manner 
Admiral Bowen’s memoirs led us to believe. Of the many factors that led to the allied 
victory in World War II, we must count the ability to solve major supply problems as 
significant.  
 Although high steam represented a substantial technological advantage for the 
United States Navy, it was in all likelihood not critical to the US victory in the Pacific 
Theater. In industrial capacity alone, the United States dwarfed Japan, and in any 
protracted-war scenario, the Japanese could not hope to match their opponent. 
Considering many of the production problems stemming from high steam had roots in 
the inexperience of the Navy in dealing with the new technology, one cannot help but 
wonder what impact earlier or later adoption would have had on the course of the 
war. The only insight we have into the strategy of a war without high steam can be 
drawn from US war plans that predated widespread employment of this technology 
by the Navy.
94
 What can be stated for certain is that fewer destroyers were available 
to the United States at all stages of the Second World War than might have been 
available had the Navy fully grasped the implications of high steam or even taken a 
pass on it. That the Navy was able to maintain and, eventually, expand production of 
high-steam vessels at all during the war was a remarkable accomplishment and by no 
means inevitable. 
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Delayed Destroyers Reported to the Bureau of Ships 
 The following tables show the projected delays in the delivery of turbines for 
destroyers as they were reported to the Bureau of Ships. As turbines had to be 
delivered by the time a ship was launched in order to ensure its commissioning on 
schedule, the effectiveness of the Bureau of Ships’ efforts to reduce the delays can be 
seen by checking how much time passed between a delayed ship’s launch and its 
commissioning in the Navy. This period, typically two to three months for major 
yards and three to five for minor ones, was the time during which engines, 
electronics, and weapons were installed. 
Table A-1: Projected Delays in the Delivery of Allis-Chalmers (A-C) and General Electric (GE) 


















472 Navy A-C 4-5.5 2/20/42 12/15/42 10 
473 Navy A-C 4-5.5 4/16/42 2/9/43 10 
474 Navy A-C 4-5.5 4/16/42 2/9/43 10 
475 Navy A-C 4-5.5 6/3/42 4/13/43 10.5 
476 Navy A-C 4-5.5 2/20/42 11/17/42 9 
477 Navy A-C 4-5.5 5/2/42 9/15/42 4.5 
478 Navy A-C 4-5.5 5/12/42 10/15/42 5 
479 Navy A-C 4-5.5 6/24/42 2/1/43 8 




481 Navy A-C 4-5.5 10/29/42 3/4/44 16 
550 Gulf S.B. GE 2-6 5/31/42 6/23/43 13 
551 Gulf S.B. GE 2-6 7/4/43 9/18/43 2.5 
552 Gulf S.B. GE 2-6 10/4/42 12/11/43 14 
553 Gulf S.B. GE 2-6 11/15/42 2/2/44 14.5 
569 Consolidated GE 12-16(2-6) 3/2/42 10/27/42 8 
570 Consolidated GE 12-16(2-6) 3/16/42 11/24/42 8 
571 Consolidated GE 12-16(2-6) 4/1/42 12/8/42 8 
572 Consolidated GE 12-16(2-6) 4/15/42 12/30/42 8.5 
573 Consolidated GE 12-16(2-6) 5/7/42 1/25/43 8.5 
574 Consolidated GE 12-16(2-6) 5/7/42 2/9/43 9 
575 Consolidated GE 12-16(2-6) 8/2/42 3/31/43 8 
576 Consolidated GE 12-16(2-6) 8/16/42 4/20/43 8 
577 Consolidated GE 12-16(2-6) 8/31/42 5/19/43 8.5 
578 Consolidated GE 12-16(2-6) 9/13/42 6/16/43 9 
579 Consolidated GE 12-16(2-6) 9/27/42 7/6/43 10 
580 Consolidated GE 12-16(2-6) 10/11/42 7/31/43 9.5 
581 Navy A-C 1.5-4 6/3/42 5/18/43 11.5 
582 Navy A-C 1.5-4 7/18/42 6/8/43 11.5 
583 Navy A-C 1.5-4 7/18/42 7/6/43 11.5 
584 Navy A-C 1.5-4 3/19/43 8/19/43 5 
585 Navy A-C 1.5-4 3/19/43 9/16/43 6 
586 Navy A-C 1.5-4 7/4/43 11/10/43 3 
587 Navy A-C 1.5-4 6/24/42 3/4/43 8.5 
588 Navy A-C 1.5-4 8/8/42 4/3/43 8 
589 Navy A-C 1.5-4 8/8/42 5/15/43 9 
590 Navy A-C 1.5-4 4/7/43 10/25/43 6.5 




592 Navy A-C 1.5-4 1/10/43 4/3/44 15 
593 Navy A-C 1.5-4 1/10/43 5/4/44 16 
594 Navy A-C 1.5-4 9/25/44 11/4/44 1.5 
595 Navy A-C 1.5-4 9/25/44 11/18/44 2 
596 Navy A-C 1.5-4 9/25/44 2/8/45 4.5 
597 Navy A-C 1.5-4 9/25/44 2/22/45 5 
Sources: Bureau of Ships Memorandum, “Main Turbine Delivery & Requirement Dates for 
Navy Destroyers”, 11 June 1941 (RG 19) and Friedman, U.S. Navy Destroyers, 488-507. 
  
Table A-2: Projected Delays in the Delivery of Westinghouse Turbines for Destroyers as of 
















449 Bath -- Feb 1942 2/19/42 6/4/42 3.5 
450 Bath 1/23/42 Feb 1942 3/14/42 6/26/42 3.5 
451 Bath 3/5/42 Mar 1942 4/11/42 7/20/42 3 
467 Bath 3/20/42 Apr 1942 5/17/42 8/7/42 2.5 
468 Bath 4/5/42 May 1942 6/7/42 8/28/42 2.5 
469 Bath 4/16/42 June 1942 6/28/42 9/21/42 3 
470 Bethlehem 11/1/42 July 1943 7/7/42 11/14/42 4 
471 Bethlehem 12/1/42 July 1943 8/24/42 12/23/42 4 
507 Bath 5/7/42 Aug 1942 8/16/42 10/9/42 2 
508 Bath 6/10/42 Nov 1942 8/20/42 10/30/42 2.5 
509 Bath 7/10/42 Dec 1942 8/30/42 11/20/42 2.5 
510 Bath 8/10/42 Dec 1942 8/20/42 12/4/42 3.5 
511 Bath 9/9/42 Feb 1943 10/11/42 12/22/42 2.5 
512 Bath 10/10/42 Apr 1943 10/27/42 1/8/43 2.5 




514 Bath 10/30/42 June 1943 12/6/42 2/10/43 2 
515 Bath 11/30/42 July 1943 12/20/42 2/26/43 2 
516 Bath 12/27/42 Aug 1943 1/10/43 3/16/43 2 
517 Bath 1/30/43 Sept 1943 1/31/43 4/3/43 2 
518 Bethlehem 1/15/43 Aug 1943 9/24/42 2/3/43 4.5 
519 Bethlehem 2/15/43 Sept 1943 10/24/42 3/10/43 4.5 
520 Bethlehem 4/1/43 Oct 1943 11/24/42 4/12/43 4.5 
521 Bethlehem 7/1/43 Jan 1944 2/4/43 5/22/43 3.5 
522 Bethlehem 8/1/43 Feb 1944 3/6/43 6/21/43 3.5 
526 Bethlehem 10/1/42 June 1943 8/18/42 2/5/43 5.5 
527 Bethlehem 11/1/42 July 1943 8/17/42 3/12/43 7 
528 Bethlehem 1/1/43 Aug 1943 10/10/42 5/10/43 7 
529 Bethlehem 3/1/43 Sept 1943 10/27/42 5/10/43 6.5 
530 Bethlehem 4/1/43 Oct 1943 10/22/42 5/28/43 7 
531 Bethlehem 5/1/43 Nov 1943 11/20/42 6/18/43 7 
532 Bethlehem 6/1/43 Dec 1943 12/5/42 7/6/43 7 
533 Bethlehem 7/1/43 Dec 1943 12/19/42 7/29/43 7.5 
534 Bethlehem 8/1/43 Feb 1944 1/10/43 8/19/43 7 
535 Bethlehem 9/1/43 Feb 1944 2/15/43 8/31/43 6.5 
536 Bethlehem 10/1/43 Mar 1944 3/21/43 9/20/43 6 
537 Bethlehem 11/1/43 Apr 1944 4/4/43 9/30/43 5.5 
538 Bethlehem 12/1/43 Apr 1944 4/28/43 10/21/43 6 
539 Bethlehem 1/1/44 May 1944 5/28/43 11/25/43 6 
540 Bethlehem 2/1/44 May 1944 7/11/43 12/1/43 4.5 
541 Bethlehem 4/1/44 June 1944 7/25/43 12/30/43 5 
567 Sea-Tac 4/1/44 -- 12/31/43 4/29/44 4 
568 Sea-Tac 5/1/44 -- 1/29/44 4/24/44 3 




630 Bath 4/1/43 Oct 1943 3/7/43 4/23/43 1.5 
631 Bath 4/30/43 Nov 1943 3/21/43 5/28/43 2 
642 Bath 5/30/43 Nov 1943 4/4/43 6/15/43 2.5 
643 Bath 6/30/43 Dec 1943 4/24/43 6/29/43 2 
644 Bath 7/30/43 Jan 1944 5/8/43 7/16/43 2 
657 Bethlehem 9/15/43 Mar 1944 4/3/43 7/23/43 3.5 
658 Bethlehem 10/15/43 Apr 1944 5/3/43 8/23/43 3.5 
Sources: Correspondence, W.J. Kastor, Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. to 
Inspector of Machinery, USN, “Propulsion Equipment – 2150 Ton Destroyers”, 2 February 1942. 
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